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The two cases on which this symposium focuses-J. McIntyre Machinery,S 1 .. 2
Ltd. v. Nicastro and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown -are
the Supreme Court's first efforts at applying International Shoe Co. v.
Washington3 since the Burnham v. Superior Court4 decision in 1990.
Remarkably, they are the first cases since the Eisenhower Administration in
which the Court has applied International Shoe without the participation of
Justice William J. Brennan. From McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.5 in
1957 through Burnham, Brennan was there. 6  And no Justice wrote more
personal jurisdiction opinions than he. During that span, the Court applied
International Shoe to determine the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction over
*Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University. I am indebted to Tom Arthur,
Collin Freer, Peter Hay, and Rocky Rhodes for comments on an earlier draft. I also thank Arthur
Miller, Wendy Perdue, Allan Stein, Adam Steinman, and Howard Stravitz for helpful discussion.
And I am very grateful to Professor Stravitz and the South Carolina Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this Symposium.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
2. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
5. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
6. President Eisenhower appointed Brennan on October 15, 1956, and McGee was argued
on November 20, 1957. Id.; see Rodney A. Grunes & Jon Veen, Justice Brennan, Catholicism, and
the Establishment Clause, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 527, 538 (2001). Brennan retired on July 20, 1990,
and Burnham had been decided on May 29, 1990. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 604; Grunes & Veen,
supra, at 539.
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a non-consenting nonresident in twelve cases.7 In that dozen, Brennan wrote
nine opinions. s Yet, for all his efforts to explain his position and persuade his
colleagues, he commanded a majority only once, in Burger King.
9
Brennan waged two major battles with his colleagues about International
Shoe. The first, through 1984, concerned methodology. Brennan espoused what
can be called a "m6lange" approach, under which all factors relevant to an
International Shoe analysis-contact, state's interest, burden on the defendant,
etc.-are considered together ad hoc to assess jurisdiction under a general rubric
of fairness. 10 Ultimately, Brennan lost this battle. The Court adopted a rigid,
defendant-centric, two-step model in which the issue of contact between the
defendant and the forum is primary." Only if a defendant-initiated contact is
established will a court consider the fairness and reasonableness of jurisdiction, .
In other words, if the defendant does not create a contact with the forum, there
7. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 604; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee,
355 U.S. at 220.
I do not include Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, because it upheld personal jurisdiction over
plaintiff class members on the basis of consent, and not through the application of International
Shoe. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814 (1985). Similarly, I do not include
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, which upheld jurisdiction based
upon waiver. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982).
Of the twelve, ten cases involved the exercise of in personam jurisdiction and two, Rush and
Shaffer, involved the attempted invocation of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607-
28; Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 463-64; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413;
Calder, 465 U.S. at 784-85; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287;
Rush, 444 U.S. at 322; Kulko, 436 U.S. at 86; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 196; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-
51; McGee, 355 U.S. at 220.
8. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., concurring); Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-21
(Brennan, J., concurring); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 463-87 (majority opinion); Helicopteros, 466
U.S. at 419-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring); World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299-313 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rush, 444 U.S. at 299-313, 333
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 101-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
219-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Court may be particularly fractious in addressing personal jurisdiction. Of the twelve
cases, only two (McGee and Calder) were unanimous. Calder, 465 U.S. at 784; McGee, 355 U.S. at
224. In McGee, Justice Black wrote for eight Justices-Chief justice Warren did not participate in
the case. McGee, 355 U.S. at 220, 224. Brennan's independence is shown by the fact that he joined
another Justice's majority opinion only twice-in McGee, unanimous opinion by Justice Black, and
Calder, unanimous opinion by Justice Rehnquist-and joined another Justice's dissent only once,
Justice Black's dissent in Hanson. Calder, 465 U.S. at 784; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 256 (Black, J.,
dissenting); McGee, 355 U.S. at 221.
9. 471 U.S. at 463.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 124-125.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 128-13 1.
[VOL. 63: 551
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cannot be jurisdiction, no matter how convenient the forum or compelling the
forum state's interest or the plaintiff s need.
Brennan acceded to the two-step approach in 1985.13 Doing so allowed him
to write the majority opinion in Burger King.14 With that case, Brennan began
his second battle, over how to apply the two-step approach. 15 Brennan cleverly
imported into his Burger King opinion ideas from his dissents, in an effort to
moderate the defendant-centered thrust of the now-regnant methodology." The
impact of that effort is difficult to assess, though, because the remaining personal
jurisdiction cases of Brennan's career, Asahi and Burnham, resulted in
frustrating 4-to-4 splits, with Brennan espousing one of two equally adopted
views. 17
Now we have a new century and two new cases. Brennan has not been
forgotten. All three opinions in J. McIntyre quote or discuss aspects of his
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, as does the unanimous opinion in
Goodyear.9 But, has Brennan been influential? My goal is to trace Brennan's
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and assess its imprint, if any, in the new
decisions. The scorecard will say no: J. McIntyre and Goodyear reject much of
what Brennan advocated.20 Brennan would be especially displeased with the
parsimonious views of Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, speaking for six
Justices in J. McIntyre, concerning what constitutes a relevant contact under
International Shoe.21  Brennan's views on general jurisdiction are largely
rejected in Goodyear, which he would undoubtedly view as too limiting."
I will argue that Brennan, through a part of Burger King that is often
overlooked, has had an influence and indeed is responsible for the parsimony
seen in the new cases, particularly J. McIntyre. In Burger King, Brennan created
a presumption that jurisdiction will be proper when the defendant has relevant
contacts with the forum. 23  He placed an inordinately high burden on the
defendant to overcome that burden. 24  As a result, a defendant will find it
virtually impossible to escape jurisdiction by appealing to fairness factors.
Accordingly, the only realistic option for a court wishing to reject personal
jurisdiction is to find that the defendant has not forged relevant contacts with the
13. See infra text accompanying note 158.
14. 471 U.S. at 463.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part II.
17. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
18. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788-89 (2011) (plurality opinion
of Kennedy, J.); id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
19. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011).
20. See infra Part Ill.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
24. See id.
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forum. This explains why Justices Kennedy and Breyer do not even discuss
whether the exercise of jurisdiction over J. McIntyre in New Jersey would be
fair. They place all their eggs in the contact basket and strain to conclude that
there was none. Thus, the Brennan legacy is ironic and unintended: the leading
advocate of a flexible, fairness-based assessment of personal jurisdiction forced
the Court not only to focus on contact, but to adopt a cramped and
unaccommodating view of it.
I. BRENNAN'S FIRST BATTLE: THE MtLANGE APPROACH
A. The Influence of Justice Black
International Shoe put a variety of topics on the table for assessing the
constitutionality of personal jurisdiction. The iconic quotation from the opinion
is that the defendant must have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' ' '25  The Court noted that "lain 'estimate of the
inconveniences' which would result to the [defendant] from a trial away from its
'home ' ',26 is relevant, as are considerations of the "quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws" and
whether a defendant "exercise[d] the privilege of conducting activities within a
state.'27  Subsequent cases add factors such as purposeful availment 28 and
foreseeability. 29 Nowhere, however, did International Shoe prescribe an order in
which such things should be addressed. Brennan long advocated that the
International Shoe factors should be approached in a gestalt manner-that all
relevant issues be considered at once, guided by overall principles of fairness.
30
Brennan learned this m6lange approach from Justice Black. Brennan came
to the Supreme Court3 1 just as Black was taking the lead in shaping the
25. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
26. Id. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)).
27. Id. at 319.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 76-8 1.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (Justice Kennedy characterizing Brennan's approach in the Asahi cases as "advocating a
rule based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability"); see also infra note 242.
31. Before President Eisenhower appointed him to the Supreme Court, Brennan had served
on all three levels of the New Jersey judiciary. Francis P. McQuade & Alexander T. Kardos, Mr.
Justice Brennan and His Legal Philosophy, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 321, 323 (1958). He was
appointed to the trial bench on the Law Division of the Superior Court in January 1949. Id. After
twenty-one months, he was elevated to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court. Id. He served
there only eighteen months before going to the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1952. Id. Four and a
half years later, he was appointed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 324.
[VOL. 63: 551
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interpretation of International Shoe.32 Black appears to have been a reluctant
convert. His separate opinion in International Shoe asked, in essence: why re-
characterize jurisdictional doctrine in an easy case-one for which there was no
doubt under existing case law about "doing business"? 33  He criticized the
injection of "uncertain elements" and imprecise terms such as "fair play" and
"substantial justice"-theretofore used only as "additional reasons" for
holdings-as the constitutional standard. 34 His caution was born of fear that the.... 35
Court would use these open-ended concepts to restrict state-court jurisdiction.
To avoid that possibility, Black seized the reins to mold a broad
interpretation. By the time Brennan got to Washington, the Court had cited
International Shoe in twelve cases. Of those, only two were honest-to-goodness
personal jurisdiction cases. 36 One of these was the general jurisdiction decision
32. Though I found no record of decisions by Brennan on the New Jersey trial court or
Appellate Division, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited International Shoe in four personal
jurisdiction cases during Brennan's tenure there. Farone v. Habel, 123 A.2d 506, 509 (N.J. 1956);
Korff v. G & G Corp., 122 A.2d 889, 896 (N.J. 1956); Whalen v. Young, 104 A.2d 678, 682 (N.J.
1954); A & M Trading Corp. v. Pa. R. Co., 100 A.2d 513, 516 (N.J. 1953). Brennan wrote no
opinions in these cases, but his record was the same as it would be on the Supreme Court. When the
New Jersey court upheld jurisdiction, he joined the majority. Farone, 123 A.2d at 511; Korff, 122
A.2d at 897; A & M Trading Corp., 100 A.2d at 518. When it rejected jurisdiction, he dissented.
Whalen, 104 A.2d at 684.
Whalen was a wrongful death case brought by the estate of a New Jersey man killed in a
collision with a vehicle operated by a nonresident and owned by another nonresident. Id. at 679. In
a 4-to-3 decision, the court rejected jurisdiction over the owner concerning an indemnity claim. Id.
at 683-84. The court cited International Shoe twice, but based its constitutional decision on
implied consent; the case was more about Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), than about
International Shoe. Whalen, 104 A.2d at 682-83. Brennan is recorded as one of the three justices
who would have upheld jurisdiction. Id. at 684. Frustratingly, however, the state practice was to
list justices for and against reversal of the lower court and not to publish dissenting opinions.
Nowhere, then, do we find a discussion by Brennan or others as to why they would have upheld
jurisdiction.
33. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 322-26 (Black, J.).
34. Id. at 323-25 ("There is a strong emotional appeal in the words 'fair play,' 'justice,' and
,reasonableness.' But they were not chosen by those who wrote the original Constitution or the
Fourteenth Amendment as a measuring rod for this Court to use in invalidating State or Federal
laws passed by elected legislative representatives.").
35. Id. at 325 ("Nor can I stretch the meaning of due process so far as to authorize this Court
to deprive a State of the right to afford judicial protection to its citizens on the ground that it would
be more 'convenient' for the corporation to be sued somewhere else.").
36. In ten of the twelve cases, Black did not write the majority opinion. Polizzi v. Cowles
Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953) (discussed infra at note 65); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander,
337 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1949) (Jackson, J.) (state ad valorem tax violates corporation's equal
protection right and citing International Shoe as not affecting the notion that corporations are
entitled to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection); United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S.
795, 818 (1948) (British corporation exploiting inventions in United States subject to Clayton Act,
and service where agent "transacting business" constituted a proper venue, and citing International
Shoe for proposition that service of process on agent in district was not unfair); Conn. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 551 (1948) (upholding escheat to New York of unclaimed insurance
funds, and citing International Shoe that it is "reasonable and just" to enforce insurance contract
obligations in New York); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 77-78, 91 (1947) (Black, J.,
20121
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of Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., in which Black concurred in the
judgment without opinion.37 The other was Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,
38in which Black wrote for the Court. The year after Brennan joined the Court,
Black authored the unanimous opinion in McGee.39 Thus, Black wrote for the
Court in the first two specific jurisdiction cases applying International Shoe.
Both Travelers Health and McGee were suits against out-of-state insurers.4 In
each, Black employed an unstructured m6lange approach.
Travelers Health upheld a Virginia blue sky law that required out-of-state
companies to obtain a license before offering to sell securities, including
certificates of insurance, in the Commonwealth; such businesses were required
to appoint a state officer to receive process. 4' Travelers was a nonprofit health
insurance association, formed and operating in Nebraska.42 Members paid an
initiation fee and periodic assessment to the office in Omaha.43 The association
had no paid agents and relied on recommendations from existing members.
44
When a member recommended someone, the Omaha office would solicit him by
mail.45 Travelers had done such business in Virginia for four decades and had
about 800 members there.46
The Virginia Corporation Commission filed a cease and desist proceeding
against the association and an officer.47 The defendants appeared specially and
moved to quash.48  After the Virginia courts upheld jurisdiction, the Supreme
dissenting) (referencing International Shoe regarding the Bill of Rights and noting that Black
disagrees with the majority's test: whether the absence of the right is contrary to "natural justice");
W. Publ'g Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946) (per curiam) (providing a one sentence
affirmation of the lower court where International Shoe is included in a string citation without
discussion); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 411-12 n.4, 416 n.14, 433 n.43, 436
(1946) (state tax on insurance company upheld in light of the McCarran Act, and International Shoe
is cited in three footnotes without discussion); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228, 233-34 (1946)
(New York judgment regarding alimony arrearage void for lack of notice, though notice was given
in earlier related suit, and International Shoe is cited as a case in which notice was proper); id. at
237-38, 248 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (Black joins Rutledge's dissent, which cites Pennoyer three
times and never cites International Shoe); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 422, 434-35
(1946) (local ordinance on drummers violates commerce clause, and citing International Shoe as
part of an argument that it expanded the notion of what constituted "doing business," to which
Black dissented without opinion); Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946)
(upholding service of process on designated corporate agent, and International Shoe is cited for the
proposition that service of process renders the corporation "'present' there for purposes of service").
37. 342 U.S. 437, 449 (1952).
38. 339 U.S. 643, 644 (1950).
39. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957).
40. Id.; Travelers Health, 339 U.S. at 645.
41. Travelers Health, 339 U.S. at 646-47.
42. Id. at 645.
43. Id. 645-46.
44. Id. at 646.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Court rejected defendants' due process objections.49 It held that, "the state has
power to issue a 'cease and desist order' enforcing at least that regulatory
provision requiring the Association to accept service of process by Virginia
claimants on the Secretary of the Commonwealth.,
50
Black's opinion on the personal jurisdiction point, the Court's first
application of International Shoe, comprises three paragraphs. 51 It mixes aspects
of contact and state's interest in the very first sentence: "[T]he contacts and ties
of appellants with Virginia residents, together with that state's interest in faithful
observance of the certificate obligations, justify subjecting appellants to cease
and desist proceedings ...., In terms that presage McGee, he spoke of
solicitation, and raised the notion of a social contract, a quid pro quo:
[The association's] insurance certificates, systematically and widely
delivered in Virginia following solicitation based on recommendations
of Virginians, create continuing obligations between the Association and
each of the many certificate holders in the state. Appellants have caused
claims for losses to be investigated and the Virginia courts were
available to them in seeking to enforce obligations created by the group
of certificates.
53
The next paragraph focuses on the unfairness that would result if Virginia
lacked jurisdiction: "[C]laims are seldom so large that Virginia policyholders
could afford the expense and trouble of a Nebraska law suit. 4 Moreover,
Virginia is the center of gravity, "where witnesses would most likely live and
where claims for losses would presumably be investigated., 55 Black notes that
"such factors have been given great weight in applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens," and that it is often unfair to require plaintiffs to "seek redress only
in some distant state where the insurer is incorporated., 56 Then the state's
interest reappears: "The Due Process Clause does not forbid a state to protect its
citizens from such injustice. 57 Finally, Black appeals broadly: "Metaphysical
concepts of 'implied consent' and 'presence' in a state should not be solidified
into a constitutional barrier against Virginia's simple, direct and fair plan for
service of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
58
49. Id. at 647.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 648-49.
52. Id. at 648.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 649.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citations omitted) (analogizing this point to International Shoe).
57. ld. at 649.
58. Id. The Court then addressed and rejected the argument that the Virginia statute
impermissibly impaired the right to make contracts. Id. at 650. Black's opinion was signed by five
other Justices. See id. at 651, 655. Justice Douglas concurred separately. Id. at 651. Interestingly,
2012]
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Seven years later, then with Brennan onboard, Black wrote the majority
opinion in McGee.59 Again, he adopted the m6lange approach, in one paragraph
going from contact, to state's interest, to burden on plaintiffs, to forum non
conveniens factors:
[W]e think it apparent that the Due Process Clause did not preclude the
California court from entering a judgment binding on respondent. It is
sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a
contract which had substantial connection with that State. The contract
was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and
the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be
denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were
forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to
hold it legally accountable. When claims were small or moderate
individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an
action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company judgment
proof. Often the crucial witnesses-as here on the company's defense
of suicide-will be found in the insured's locality.
60
Two aspects of Black's effort in McGee deserve note because they would
resonate in Brennan opinions for decades. First, Black's view of contact is quite
broad. He did not focus on contacts between the defendant and the forum.
Rather, he concluded that due process was provided because "the suit was based
on a contract which had substantial connection with [the forum] State.' 61 In
other words, the relationship between the parties-the contract and the
litigation-might be sufficiently related to satisfy any requirement of a contact
between defendant and the forum.
Second, though the holding required the insurance company to defend in
California, the burden was not of constitutional significance. 62 Black focused on
the "fundamental transformation of our national economy.' '63 Because interstate
business was increasingly routine, so were opportunities that defendants would
Justice Minton, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented. Id. at 655. They distinguished International
Shoe as involving agents operating in the forum, on whom service was effected. Id. at 658-59.
Citing Pennoyer, they said: "An in personam judgment cannot be based upon service by registered
letter on a nonresident corporation or a natural person, neither of whom has ever been within the
State of Virginia." Id. at 658 (citing Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22-23
(1907); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)).
59. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957).
60. Id. at 223 (citations omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 224.
63. Id. at 222.
[VOL. 63: 551
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be sued in multiple states. 64 Thus, to Black, "a trend is clearly discernible
toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other nonresidents." 65 Moreover, "modem transportation and
communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.
66
Through 1957, then, the Court had applied International Shoe twice in
specific jurisdiction cases. Black wrote for the Court in both cases and firmly
established a melange approach aimed at an overall determination of whether
jurisdiction would be fair on the facts of a case. Another case reflecting this
common sense approach was Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,67
which upheld New York's authority to bind thousands of beneficiaries of small
pooled trusts to an accounting by the fiduciary. 68  Though Justice Jackson's
opinion for the majority of the Court did not cite International Shoe, it undertook
the same flexible, practical analysis Black used in Travelers Health and
McGee.69 Thus, the state's interest in "providing means to close trusts that exist
by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts
is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its
courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident."
70
64. Id. at 222-23.
65. Id. at 222. In light of this transformation, the "Court accepted and then abandoned
'consent,' 'doing business,' and 'presence' as the standard for measuring the extent of state judicial
power." Id.
Another case is noteworthy. In Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 664 (1953),
the defendant removed a defamation case to federal court. The lower courts dismissed for improper
venue, holding that the general venue statute as then written, which permitted venue where the
defendant was "doing business," was not met. Id. at 664-65. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the venue statute did not apply in cases removed from state court. Id. at 666. In a spirited
dissent, Black criticized the majority for ducking the "doing business" question. Id. at 668-70
(Black, J., dissenting). He noted as follows:
There may have been some reason for snarling up lawsuits against foreign corporations a
hundred years ago .... But there is no such excuse now. A large part of the business in
each and every state is done today by corporations created under the laws of other states.
To adjust the practical administration of law to this situation the Court in recent years has
refused to be bound by old rigid concepts about "doing business." Whether cases are to
be tried in one locality or another is now to be tested by basic principles of fairness.
id. at 669-70.
66. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
67. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
68. See id. at 307-08, 320. The case is best known for establishing the constitutional
standard for notice. See, e.g., id. at 307 ("This controversy questions the constitutional sufficiency
of notice ...."). I am grateful to Arthur Miller for pointing out in discussion at the Symposium the
relevance of the personal jurisdiction holding of Mullane.
69. See Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global Resolution of
Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 917, 936
(1995) (noting that Justice Jackson's analysis in Mullane "reflected the hard-nosed, commonsense
pragmatism traditionally associated with the procedural due process inquiry").
70. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
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Surprisingly-especially in view of the fact that McGee was a unanimous
opinion 71-the mlange approach was not to last. On1ly eight Justices
participated in McGee, because Chief Justice Warren recused. Somehow, less
than seven months later, Warren seized the majority in the 5-to-4 decision in
Hanson,73 and took the Court in a decidedly different direction.74
Hanson held that Florida did not have personal jurisdiction over a Delaware
trustee in a case concerning the validity of a power of appointment." The
majority rejected jurisdiction in terms foreign to Travelers Health and McGee.
In Hanson, we see no concern for the state's interest or relative conveniences of
the parties. The Court does not look at whether the relationship among the
parties was connected to the forum. Instead, the focus is narrowly on whether
the defendant itself had created sufficient ties with that state. Warren asserted
that "it is essential... that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
' 76
Accordingly, "[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State."
77
Florida lacked personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee because that
trustee had not purposefully availed itself of Florida. 78 True, it had engaged in
transactions over eight years with the settlor in Florida, but only because the
settlor had moved to that state.79 Because the trustee was an indispensable party
71. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 224.
72. Id.
73. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 238, 256, 262 (1958).
74. See Redish & Beste, supra note 69, at 919 ("At some point in the late 1950s, the Supreme
Court took a wrong turn. It was at that time that the Court abandoned the pragmatic balancing
analysis traditionally associated with procedural due process and replaced it with a somewhat
streamlined-but ultimately equally rigid-brand of abstract formalism in its jurisdictional
analysis." (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. 235)); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Nineteenth Century
Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 402 (2012)
[hereinafter Rhodes, Nineteenth Century] ("Hanson was a dramatic jurisprudential shift from the
Court's other decisions since International Shoe, which predominantly relied upon balancing state
interests and litigation burdens to evaluate the propriety of jurisdiction." (citations omitted));
Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,
39 S.C. L. REv. 729, 740 (1988) ("Ignoring McGee's multiple-interest, fairness analysis, the Court
focused sharply on the nonresident defendant's relationship with the forum state.").
75. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254-55. I have always wondered if the majority was swayed by its
view of the merits. The Court seems bent on ensuring that one branch of the family not recover
from the estate of the decedent at the expense of another branch. See id. at 240. The finding that
Florida lacked personal jurisdiction accomplished that. See id. ("Residuary legatees Denckla and
Stewart, already the recipients of over $500,000 each, urge that the power of appointment over the
$400,000 appointed to sister Elizabeth's children was not 'effectively exercised' and that the
property should accordingly pass to them.").
76. Id. at 253 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 254.
79. Id. at 239.
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in the case, which was a dispute among potential takers from a Florida settlor in
an estate being probated in Florida, Florida's judgment could not be upheld.
80
To Warren, the acts of the defendant, rather than the location of the controversy,
was the predominant factor:
[The state] does not acquire. .. jurisdiction by being the "center of
gravity" of the controversy, or the most convenient location for
litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is
resolved in this case by considering the acts of the trustee. As we have
indicated, they are insufficient to sustain the jurisdiction.
81
In other words, if there is no contact caused by purposeful availment, there can
be no jurisdiction.
Black dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Burton.82 The dissent
sounded two familiar themes: (1) the Court should adopt a broader view of
contact, and (2) general principles of fairness, including forum non conveniens
factors, should be part of the calculus. 83 Black's view of contact-looking at the
relationship as a whole-reflects his unanimous opinion in McGee just months
earlier:
[W]here a transaction has as much relationship to a State as Mrs.
Donner's appointment had to Florida its courts ought to have power to
adjudicate controversies arising out of that transaction, unless litigation
there would impose such a heavy and disproportionate burden on a
nonresident defendant that it would offend what this Court has referred
to as "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
84
And there was no such unfairness, Black argued, because the "principal
contenders for Mrs. Donner' s largess" were citizens of Florida, and the Delaware
trustee "chose to maintain business relations with Mrs. Donner in that State for
eight years."
85
80. Id. at 254. The majority's holding that there was no personal jurisdiction over the trustee
allowed the Court to dismiss the case under Florida law of indispensability. Id. at 254-55. Black
argued that the question of whether the trustee was indispensable should have been decided in the
first instance by the Florida courts. Id. at 261-62 (Black, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 254 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 256 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas dissented separately. ld. at 262
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 256-62 (Black, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Later, he reiterated: "[W]e are dealing with
litigation arising from a transaction that had an abundance of close and substantial connections with
the State of Florida." Id. at 260 (emphasis added). Further, Black decried the majority's obsession
with contact through purposeful availment, noting that "the old jurisdictional landmarks have been
left far behind," and that "further relaxation seems certain." Id.
85. Id. at 259.
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Hanson was Black's last personal jurisdiction case. 86 In fact, the Court left
the area for nineteen years. 87 When it returned, in a flurry of cases from 1977
through 1985, Hanson's focus on a defendant-initiated contact with the forum
came to dominate. In the ten remaining personal jurisdiction cases of the
twentieth century-after Hanson and through 1990-the Court would reject
jurisdiction in seven. In six of those, the holding would be that there was no
relevant contact. Eventually, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court adopted a
rigid two-step methodology which expressly relegated considerations of fairness
to secondary status. Through 1984, Brennan doggedly resisted this move.
B. Brennan in the Wilderness
From 1977 through 1984, the Court rejected jurisdiction on lack of contact
grounds in five cases: Shaffer, Kulko, World-Wide Volkswagen, Rush, and
88 89Helicopteros. Brennan dissented in each. In the other two, Keeton and
Calder, it upheld jurisdiction and Brennan agreed; even here, though, he
concurred separately in one. 9° A review of the cases shows Brennan continually
advocating the two central points made by Black in his dissent in Hanson: a
broad concept of contact and consideration of general factors of center-of-gravity
and fairness. Along the way, Brennan would develop two ideas-one
concerning claims that "relate to" rather than "arise from" defendant's contact
with the forum and a sliding scale approach-that he would use when he finally
got his chance to write a majority opinion.
In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court held that International Shoe applies to assess
the validity of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, but, on the facts of the case, rejected
jurisdiction in Delaware over directors and officers in a derivative suit.
91
86. See Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum
Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 850-
51 (1995) (providing a timeline of personal jurisdiction cases); John P. Frank, Address, The Shelf
Life of Justice Hugo L Black, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (Justice Black was "a justice of the
Court from 1937 to 1971.").
87. See Cameron & Johnson, supra note 86, at 850-51.
88. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1984); Rush
v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 299 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 216-17 (1977).
89. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 419 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rush, 444 U.S. at 333 (Brennan's
dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen also applies to this case); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
299 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 101 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984).
91. 433 U.S. at 212, 216-17. Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 189. Justice
Powell concurred but offered cautionary language about the application of the holding in realty
cases. See id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. Id.
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Brennan agreed that International Shoe should govern, but dissented from the
majority's application of that case to reject jurisdiction.92 Interestingly, Justice
Marshall's opinion for the Court started with a broad statement of the contact
component, one that echoed Black's opinions in Travelers Health and McGee. It
described the "central concern" of the analysis under International Shoe to be
"the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than
the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States." 93  This phrase seems less
focused on defendant-initiated contact than Hanson.
In application, however, the majority opinion was narrowly defendant-
centered; indeed, it was Pennoyer-like in focusing on traditional personal
jurisdiction factors. 94 The Court noted that the defendants had never set foot in
the forum.95 It rejected the plaintiff's contention that accepting employment as
fiduciaries of a Delaware corporation constituted a relevant contact.96 It did so
by transforming it into traditional terms of consent, and concluded that
Delaware's failure to legislate that fiduciaries consent to jurisdiction undercut
any state's interest. 97  The majority concluded that the defendants had no
relevant contact with Delaware.
98
Brennan took the majority to task in terms reminiscent of Black's dissent in
Hanson, principalloy arguing that modern doctrine engages more than a concern
for the defendant. To Brennan, the forum state had a "powerful interest in
insuring the availability of a convenient forum" in derivative litigation and
"valid substantive interests."' l  Regarding contact, he again looked to the
broader relationship among the defendants, the forum, and the litigation. By
voluntarily accepting a fiduciary office in a Delaware corporation, each
defendant had "invoke[d] the benefits and protections of its laws." 10 1  And
nothing in the record convinced Brennan that jurisdiction would be unfair. °2
92. See id. at 219-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 203-04 (majority opinion).
94. See id. at 213-17; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (setting forth traditional power-
based predicates of personal jurisdiction).
95. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213.
96. See id. at 214.
97. Id. at 216.
98. Id. at216-17.
99. Id. at 222-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 222-23. These interests included: (1) restitution for local corporations allegedly
victimized by fiduciary misconduct, (2) a "manifest regulatory interest" in corporate governance
and responsibility, and (3) a convenient forum for overseeing the affairs of a business it chartered.
id. at 223.
101. Id. at 227-28 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (citing Int'l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
102. Id. at 228. The record was meager because the Delaware court did not undertake an
International Shoe analysis. See id. at 196 (majority opinion). Brennan criticized the majority for
undertaking such an analysis and urged remand for the state court to do so in the first instance. Id.
at 221 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By ruling on whether International Shoe was satisfied, the Court
was guilty, in Brennan's view, of issuing an advisory opinion. Id. at 220 ("[A] purer example of an
advisory opinion is not to be found.").
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The following year, the Court decided Kulko. 10 3 The majority concluded
that a father's purchasing a one-way ticket for one of his children to move from
New York to California to live with their mother (his ex-wife) could not sustain
personal jurisdiction in California for a child-support claim.°4 Here, curiously,
the Court stated the basic contact test more narrowly than it had in Shaffer.
Instead of looking for contact among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,
the focus was defendant-centric again: "[A] sufficient connection between the
defendant and the forum State .. ,,105 The majority found no such
connection. 106 Interestingly, the Court suggested that jurisdiction also would not
be fair, in part because of substantive social policies; specifically, upholding
jurisdiction would dissuade divorced parents from acquiescing in a child's desire
to live with the other parent.10 7 This consideration of fairness seems odd in light
of the conclusion that there was no relevant contact. 1°8 Any thought that this
might signal a return to the m6lange approach, however, would be rebuffed two
years later in World- Wide Volkswagen.
Brennan's dissent in Kulko, joined by two others, consisted of a single
paragraph in which he acknowledged that the issue was close and agreed that the
Court faced the "single narrow question" of how the facts should be weighed. 109
He simply disagreed with the way the majority weighed those facts.F ° His
independent assessment led him to conclude that the father's "connection with
the State of California was not too attenuated" to require him to defend there."'
Two years later, the Court decided companion cases, World-Wide
Volkswagen 12 and Rush v. Savchuk.1 3 In the former, it rejected in personam
jurisdiction in Oklahoma over the New York retailer and regional distributor of
an automobile involved in a wreck near Tulsa.' 14 In Rush, the Court rejected
quasi in rem jurisdiction over an Indiana driver in Minnesota, based upon
103. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
104. Id. at 101.
105. Id. at 91 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463--64 (1940)).
106. Id. at 92.
107. See id. at 93, 98-10 1. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court cited this aspect of Kulko as
relevant to "the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citing Kulko,
436 U.S. at 93, 98).
108. See Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet,
and the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 602 (1998) ("[T]he Court in
Calder mystifyingly ignored its purposeful availment standard, albeit without acknowledging that it
was doing so. Instead ... it employed the very center-of-gravity 'focal point' jurisdictional analysis
that it had expressly rejected on previous occasions.").
109. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 101 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 92).
110. Id. at 102.
111. Id.
112. 444 U.S. 286.
113. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
114. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288-89, 295.
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garnishment of the contractual obligation of an insurance company to defend and
indemnify the driver.I"
5
The majority opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen embraced the strongest
defendant-centric focus yet. There is no talk of connections "among the
defendant[s], the forum, and the litigation," as in Shaffer. 116 Instead, as in Kulko,
there must be minimum contacts "between the defendant and the forum State.""
' t 7
The focus is on the "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum
State."' 18
Whatever one thinks of the result and the methodology, Justice White's
majority opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen at least brought clarity on four
fronts. First, the International Shoe test consists of two parts: contact and
fairness. 1 9 The two prongs are animated by different concerns; contact reflects
interstate federalism, while fairness reflects the defendant's due process liberty
interest. Two years afterward, the Court changed its mind in Insurance Corp.
of Ireland, and held that due process protects only the defendant's liberty
interest. 12  One would think the repudiation of the interstate federalism
justification of personal jurisdiction doctrine would cause the Court to reconsider
its two-pronged approach. 122  It did not do so, however. Even Brennan
himself-in Burger King, decided three years after Insurance Corp. of Ireland-
paid obeisance to the two analytical prongs.123
115. Rush, 444 U.S. at 322-23, 333. This practice had become known as "Seider
jurisdiction." Id. at 325 (citing Seider v. Roth, 216 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1966)).
116. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. at 291 (majority opinion) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)).
118. Id. at 297.
119. See id. at 291-92.
120. Id. at 292. In Hanson, the Court said that due process restrictions on personal jurisdiction
"are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States." Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
121. Ins. Corp. of fr. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
122. See Redish & Beste, supra note 69, at 940 (noting that the Court failed to acknowledge
the "unambiguous departure from the theoretical model underlying World-Wide's purposeful
availment test or (more importantly) even consider the possibility that World-Wide's doctrinal
standard should be altered in light of the apparent rejection of that standard's underlying theoretical
structure"). Just one year after World-Wide Volkswagen, and before Insurance Corp. of Ireland,
Professor Redish argued that nothing in the language or history of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment "would lead one to believe that interstate sovereignty concerns would play
any role in its interpretation." Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1112, 1120 (1981). See also Stravitz,
supra note 74, at 779 (suggesting that Insurance Corp. should have led to rethinking of contact as a
due process requirement for personal jurisdiction).
123. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). Professor Stein has
demonstrated that personal jurisdiction, while embracing a liberty interest, "reflect[s] the general
limits on state sovereignty inherent in a federal system." Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and
Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 689 (1987).
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Second, the majority makes clear, as the Court strongly implied in Hanson,
that a court must assess contact first.124 Without a relevant contact, there simply
can be no jurisdiction, even if the forum would not be unfair. 125 Thus, once the
majority in World-Wide Volkswagen found "a total absence of those affiliating
circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court
jurisdiction,"'  it engaged in no analysis of whether jurisdiction in Oklahoma
would have been fair or reasonable.' 
27
Third, in assessing contact, the court is to look to purposeful availment and
foreseeability. 128 The former, of course, was injected by Hanson, and focuses on
the defendant's acts; the unilateral activity of someone other than the
defendant-such as the plaintiffs driving a car from New York to Oklahoma-
cannot create a relevant contact between the defendant and the forum. 29
Foreseeability is new-but it is not foreseeability of the product getting to the
forum. Rather, it must be foreseeable that the defendant "should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court" in the forum state. 130 This requirement, that
"defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State" render suit there
foreseeable, permits "potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with
some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable to suit.'
31
Fourth, the Court collected in one place five non-exclusive factors that are
relevant to assessing whether litigation in the forum is fair: (1) "burden on the
defendant," (2) "forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," (3) "the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," (4) "the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution," and (5) "the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies. '' 32 This discussion was dictum because, again, the Court held there
was no relevant contact. But clearly, the factors high on Black and Brennan's
124. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254).
125. Id. ("[E]ven if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due
Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the
State of its power to render a valid judgment." (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254)).
126. Id. at 295.
127. See id. at 295-99. The Court's holding was plainly based on its finding of "no 'contacts,
ties, or relations' with the State of Oklahoma." Id. at 299 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319); see
also id. at 297-98 (discussing Hanson and its requirement of purposeful availment but concluding
that "there is no such or similar basis for Oklahoma jurisdiction over World-Wide or Seaway in this
case").
128. See id. at 297-98.
129. Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 292; see also Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction
Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 531, 539 (1995) ("Thus concepts usually associated with the
discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens were elevated to constitutional status."). Black had
expressly recognized forum non conveniens factors as relevant to the assessment of personal
jurisdiction in McGee. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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list-state's interest, plaintiff's interest, and burden on defendant-are relegated
to secondary status. They are not relevant to an assessment of contact. They
relate to fairness, which is not even addressed in the absence of a relevant
contact.
This rigid two-step analysis, in which fairness cannot trump a lack of
contact, declared the death of the m6lange approach. Brennan dissented, again
arguing that the Court made too much of contact and defined contact too
narrowly. 133 Quoting Black from McGee, Brennan asserted that International
Shoe inherited from Pennoyer a "defendant focus" which was no longer
appropriate Iven the way in which "the structure of our society has changed"
since 1945. The increase in interstate commerce and ease of travel meant that
"the interests of the forum State and other parties" are "entitled to as much
weight" as the defendant's interest. 135 The majority "focus[es] tightly on the
existence of contacts between the forum and the defendant," and thus "accord[s]
too little weight to the strength of the forum State's interest in the case [while]
fail[ing] to explore whether there would be any actual inconvenience to the
,,136defendant. Its new focus on foreseeability of suit in the forum, to Brennan,
gives the defendant a "veto power" over jurisdiction, which is inappropriate in
an era in which jurisdiction is no longer based upon notions of implied
consent. 1
37
Interestingly, Brennan here conceded that there must be a relevant contact.
But his concept is broader than the majority's. For Brennan, contact may be
"among the parties, the forum, and the litigation" so as to make the forum
reasonable. 13  "The contacts between any two of these should not be
determinative."1 39 In other words, "contact" need not be limited to a tie between
the defendant and the forum. Indeed, Brennan suggests that the plaintiff must
show either "that his chosen forum State has a sufficient interest in the
litigation.., or sufficient contacts with the defendant."'140  This will suffice
unless the forum is unfairly burdensome. 41 Brennan would uphold jurisdiction
in World-Wide Volkswagen because "the forum State has an interest in
permitting the litigation to go forward, the litigation is connected to the forum,
the defendant is linked to the forum, and the burden of defending is not
unreasonable."' 142 Again reflecting themes from Black's opinions in the 1950s,
133. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 308. 'The conclusion I draw is that constitutional concepts of fairness no longer
require the extreme concern for defendants that was once necessary." Id. at 309.
135. Id. at 309.
136. Id. at 299-300.
137. See id. at 312.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 310.
140. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
141. See id.
142. Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
2012]
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Brennan asserts "that a State should have jurisdiction over a case growing out of
a transaction significantly related to that State."
' 143
Brennan also suggested for the first time a sliding scale: the significance of
contacts should diminish if other considerations establish that jurisdiction would
be fair and reasonable. 144
Four years later, the Court upheld jurisdiction in defamation claims in
Keeton145 and Calder.146 Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinions in each.
Calder was for a unanimous Court. In Keeton, Brennan issued a one-paragraph
opinion concurring in the judgment. 47  Here, oddly in light of World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Court did not say that the contact assessment is focused
narrowly on the defendant's ties with the forum. Instead, it quoted the broader
language from Shaffer v. Heitner, that "[i]n judging minimum contacts, a court
properly focuses on 'the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the• ,,,148
litigation.
Note the subtle distinction between this statement and Brennan's dissent in
World-Wide Volkswagen. Both speak of the relationship among three things,
two of which (the forum and the litigation) are the same in each. But the third is
different. The Court speaks of "the defendant," while Brennan considers "the
parties." 49 Brennan's statement is broader and opens the door to consideration
of the plaintiff's interest. This also is reminiscent of Travelers Health and
McGee, in which Black expressed concern for the impecunious or small-claim
plaintiff who, without jurisdiction at home, would have to travel to a distant state
to sue.' 50 Beyond this, Brennan, we can assume, was pleased with the holding in
Calder, that a defendant can be sued in a forum by causing effects there, even
without physical presence.15
143. Id. at 310; see also id. at 305 ("[T]he interest of the forum State and its connection to the
litigation is strong. The automobile accident underlying the litigation occurred in Oklahoma. The
plaintiffs were hospitalized in Oklahoma when they brought suit. Essential witnesses and evidence
were in Oklahoma. The State has a legitimate interest in enforcing its laws designed to keep its
highway system safe, and the trial can proceed at least as efficiently in Oklahoma as anywhere
else." (citation omitted)).
144. See id. at 300.
145. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
146. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
147. 465 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring).
148. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)); Keeton,
465 U.S. at 775 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204).
149. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 312 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56, 59-60.
151. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 791. I find Brennan's concurrence in Keeton vexing. It consists
of four sentences of original text and a quotation from Insurance Corp. of Ireland. Keeton, 465
U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring). He focuses on contact, saying the contacts between the
defendants and the forum "are sufficiently important and sufficiently related to the underlying cause
of action to foreclose any concern that the constitutional limits of the Due Process Clause are being
violated." Id. "This is so," he says, "irrespective of the State's interest," which "should be relevant
only to the extent that they bear upon the liberty interests of the [defendant] that are protected by the
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In 1984, the Court also decided Helicopteros, in which the Court rejected
general jurisdiction over a Colombian corporation that provided transportation
services. 152Brennan criticized the majority for ignoring the possibility that
Texas had specific jurisdiction for the wrongful death case concerning a crash in
Peru. 153 Brennan argued that even if the claim did not arise from the defendant's
activities in the forum-which included purchasing helicopters, pilot training,
technical consultation, and receiving checks drawn from a Texas bank'--it was
sufficiently related to those activities to support jurisdiction.1 55 For Brennan, the
contacts were "directly and significantly related to the underlying claim" by the
plaintiff, and thus, could support specific jurisdiction.
156
In Helicopteros, Brennan continued to argue for the m6lange. He continued
to downplay contact, seeing the "principal focus" of International Shoe to be
"fairness and reasonableness to the defendant."' 57 By now though, he was the
lone dissenter. He had lost the first battle and knew it. The following year, with
Burger King, Brennan adopted the two-step approach from World-Wide
Volkswagen. Finally working from the inside, he attempted to moderate the
harshness of the regnant methodology.
II. BRENNAN'S SECOND BATTLE: APPLYING THE Two-STEP APPROACH
A. Burger King and the Burden on the Defendant
In Burger King, it is difficult to believe that one is reading a Brennan
opinion. Gone is the language about contact being broadly A auged as the
relationship "among the parties, the forum, and the litigation."' Instead, the
defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum. And, consistent with
World-Wide Volkswagen, such contacts must result from purposeful availment
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982)). Is Brennan saying that the state's interest is not part of the calculus
for contacts? Is he saying that the Insurance Corp of Ireland case, by limiting due process to
protection of a liberty interest, affected what World-Wide Volkswagen saw as two prongs of
personal jurisdiction analysis?
152. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,409, 418-19 (1984).
153. Id. at 419-20, 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 416 (majority opinion).
155. Id. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. See id. at 427. This is similar to World- Wide Volkswagen where he saw the "essential
inquiry" as "whether the particular exercise of jurisdiction offends 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."' World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
158. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320); Stravitz, supra note 74, at 777-83
(providing a detailed analysis of Brennan's opinion).
159. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
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that renders it foreseeable that the defendant could get sued in the forum.
161
Brennan shows the zeal of a convert, spending several paragraphs on these
points. Absent consent, one can be sued only where he "has 'purposefully
directed' his activities at residents of the forum."' 62 He says bluntly that "the
constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully
established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State."163 The defendant's "efforts
[must be] 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State. ' ' 64 Twice,
Brennan reminds us that the unilateral act of someone other than the defendant
cannot satisfy the contact requirement.165 Rather, the contact must "proximately
result from actions by the defendant himself."' 66
Of course, Brennan was not a convert. Undoubtedly, the idea that lack of
purposeful contact between the defendant and the forum would obviate any
consideration of state's interest and fairness was anathema. He stated fealty to
the notion' 67 and then tried to undo it. Specifically, he attempted to collapse the
two prongs of analysis into one by importing the sliding-scale concept from his
dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen.168 After listing the five fairness factors from
the majority opinion in that case, Brennan said: "These considerations
sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser
showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required."' 69 The Court
had never said this before; in this way, a notion floated in a single dissenting
opinion become part of the constitutional calculus.
Brilliantly, this "forced linkage"' 170 of the two prongs of analysis should
make it impossible to dismiss a case without at least glancing at the fairness
factors. If there is any semblance of a contact, a court must assess whether
jurisdiction would be reasonable. And if the fairness factors strongly support
jurisdiction-for example, if the forum state has a strong interest and the burden
161. Id. at 475 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299).
162. Id. at 472 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774). Professor Stravitz suggests that "directed,"
as used here, is "more inclusive" than "availed" in that "[i]t includes out-of-state actors causing in-
state effects." Stravitz, supra note 74, at 778.
163. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
164. Id. at 476 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774).
165. Id. at 474-75 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
417 (1984); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
166. Id. at 475.
167. See id. at 476 ("Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors
to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and
substantial justice."' (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320)).
168. See id. at 476-77 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
292 (1980)) (listing considerations to lower the minimum contacts required for jurisdiction); see
also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he significance of the
contacts necessary to support jurisdiction [should] diminish if some other consideration helped
establish... jurisdiction .... ").
169. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
170. Stravitz, supra note 74, at 775.
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on defendant would be relatively slight-jurisdiction can be upheld based upon a
lesser contact.
Brennan was not through. In cases of specific jurisdiction, he noted the need
for purposeful availment and that "the litigation results from alleged injuries that
'arise out of or relate to' those activities."' 71 Here, he alleviates his concern,
expressed in Helicopteros, that the Court had de facto limited specific
jurisdiction to cases arising directly from a defendant's contact with the
forum.172 This makes the relatedness assessment look more like a consideration
of the broader relationship "among the parties, the forum, and the litigation"
Brennan had long advocated.1
73
Brennan's attempted transformation of the World-Wide Volkswagen
approach was clever. It is not clear, however, that it has had much impact. For
instance, though two subsequent cases, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court174 and J. Mclntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,175 seem to cry out for
application of the sliding-scale methodology, no Justice, not even Brennan
himself in Asahi, mentioned it. Moreover, nothing has come of the "related to"
notion 76 for assessing whether there is specific jurisdiction. Instead, it is a
different part of the Burger King opinion-one which is rarely commented upon,
dealing with the burden of proof 7---that may prove influential.
Under the melange approach, the Court did not say much about which party
should bear the burden; all relevant factors were thrown into the mix at once.
With the advent of the two-step model, however, the question of burden may
have been pushed to the fore. Everyone seems to agree that, initially, the
plaintiff must show a relevant contact between the defendant and the forum. On
the facts of Burger King, this was easy. The defendants reached out to Florida to
171. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). For this proposition, Brennan quoted the definition of general
jurisdiction proffered by Helicopteros-a case in which the claim did not "arisfe] out of or relate[]
to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9. Here, in Burger
King, Brennan defines specific jurisdiction in mirror-image terms-a case involving a claim arising
from "or related to" defendant's contacts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 n.15 (quoting Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 414 n.9). In Helicopteros, as noted above, the Court was unwilling to consider specific
jurisdiction. 466 U.S. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 426-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. Brennan quoted the majority opinion in Helicopteros on this point. Burger King, 471
U.S. at 472 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414). Professor Stravitz argues that "the reference in
the opinion to litigation that 'relates to' defendant's forum state activity is misleading. It is not clear
that the Court [in Helicopteros] intended any distinction between the two concepts." Stravitz, supra
note 74, at 778 n.229. Though in Helicopteros, Brennan drew a distinction between claims that
"arise out of' and claims that "relate to" defendant's contact with the forum, "the majority refused
to consider whether there was any jurisdictional significance to the distinction because it was not
raised by the parties." Id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 & n.10).
174. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
175. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
176. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414).
177. See id. at 477-78.
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enter a twenty-year relationship with a Florida business, to be overseen from
Florida, and which Florida law governed. 178
Once contact is established, Brennan leaves no doubt that the burden shifts
to the defendant. 79 And it is a strikingly onerous burden. To defeat jurisdiction
on the grounds of unfairness, the defendant "must present a compelling case
''80
that jurisdiction is '"so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that [he] ... is at a
'severe disadvantage' in comparison to his opponent."' 81 Burger King thus
imposes a presumption: once there is a contact, jurisdiction is presumed
reasonable unless the defendant can make this showing.
Not only that, but the defendant "may not defeat jurisdiction there simply
because of his adversary's greater net wealth."' 182 Thus, an individual franchisee
in Michigan can be made to defend suit in the Florida backyard of a
multinational corporation.' 83 Granted, the defendant, Mr. Rudzewicz, was not
the typical "little guy." He was a partner in an accounting firm, versed in the
ways of business, and able to afford to litigate the personal jurisdiction question
to the Supreme Court. t84 But Brennan's lack of consideration of the economic
disparity between the parties is surprising. Instead of comparing the relative
hardships, as Black did for the Court in Travelers Health and McGee, here the
defendant is largely on his own.
185
The defendant's situation is even worse because of Brennan's ideas about
ease of travel and distant litigation. In Burger King, the defendant argued that it
would be difficult for him to call witnesses from Michigan in Florida.' 86 To
178. Id. at 465-66,480.
179. Id. at 477.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 478 (quoting Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972); McGee v.
Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). Brennan pointed out that "considerations" that might
render litigation inconvenient "usually may be accommodated through means short of finding
jurisdiction unconstitutional." Id. at 477. He noted the possibility of adopting the forum's choice of
law rules or a transfer of venue. Id.
182. Id. at 483 n.25.
183. See id. at 479-80.
184. See id. at 484-85.
185. In Travelers Health and McGee, Black weighed the relative burdens, including the
wherewithal of the parties. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223; Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950). He did so, however, in a way that helped plaintiffs. It would be difficult
for a small-claim Virginia plaintiff to sue the insurance company in Nebraska. See Travelers
Health, 339 U.S. at 648-49. It would be difficult for the aged California woman to travel to Texas
to sue to collect on a life insurance policy after her son's death. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. It is
hard not to notice that at every turn, Brennan (and Black) considered factors that were likely to
uphold the plaintiff's choice of forum and that they were not terribly concerned about-indeed
Brennan was dismissive of-burdens on defendants, at least in the domestic context. See infra text
accompanying notes 186-195.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss3/7
2012] PERSONAL JURISDICTION: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF BRENNAN 573
Brennan, this concern could be accommodated by a change of venue. 187 Of
course, changes of venue are hardly routine. Moreover, Burger King was filed in
federal court, so a transfer to federal court in Michigan was at least possible;
state-court litigation cannot be transferred across state lines. At best, a state-
court defendant would have to rely on dismissal under forum non conveniens,'
88
which, as Dean Hay reminds us, "is an uncertain and unreliable corrective
mechanism."' 
89
Brennan's dismissiveness was even more pronounced in Burnham. There,
asked to consider the plight of Dennis Burnham, who was sued in California for
a claim that arose in New Jersey, Brennan, speaking for himself and three others,
simply pointed out that travel is easier today than in earlier times,190 and that
"any burdens that do arise can be ameliorated by a variety of procedural
devices. ' 191 This response is flippant. The procedural devices he lists-like
telephonic depositions and motions for summary judgment 192-"will not always
be available or helpful.' 93  Moreover, because of the domestic relations
exception to diversity jurisdiction, 94 Mr. Burnham would not have been able to
remove the case to federal court and seek transfer to a district in New Jersey.
And because California courts generally do not dismiss under forum non
187. Id. at 483-84. He also noted that Rudzewicz had failed to establish the claimed difficulty
in the record. Id. at 483 (describing Rudzewicz's supposedly impaired ability to call witnesses as
"wholly without support in the record").
188. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 639 n.13 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring).
189. Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially Over International Defendants: Critical
Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593, 603 n.76 (1990)
[hereinafter Hay, Burnham]. Some states do not recognize the doctrine and, at best, it is a greater
longshot than a motion to transfer. See David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State
Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions,
68 TEx. L. REV. 937, 950-51 (1990).
190. "'[M]odern transportation and communications have made it much less burdensome for a
party sued to defend himself' in a State outside his place of residence." Burnham, 495 U.S. at 638
(Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474). This
statement echoes Black from McGee: "[Mlodem transportation and communication have made it
much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic
activity." McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. Of course, relative ease of travel might be used against the
plaintiff, who, except in some personal injury cases, can travel as easily as the defendant. The
plaintiff in Kulko, for example, must travel from California to New York to press her claim. See
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 87-88 (1978); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 111 (1980) [hereinafter
Brilmayer, Contacts] ("if modern transportation makes it easy to defend suits in a distant forum,
surely modem transportation is of equal utility to plaintiffs.").
191. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 639.
192. Id. at 639 n.13 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6), 30(b)(7), 56).
193. Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV.
529, 540 n.63 (1991).
194. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992).
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conveniens when the plaintiff is a resident, 195 Mr. Burnham was stuck in the
Golden State.
After Burger King, it is nearly impossible for a defendant to avoid
jurisdiction by appealing to considerations of fairness.' 96 In almost all cases, the
only realistic way for a court to reject jurisdiction is to find that the defendant
lacks a relevant contact with the forum. In the remaining personal jurisdiction
cases of the twentieth century, and of Brennan's career-Asahi and Burnham-
Brennan argued in favor of setting the bar relatively low on the question of what
constitutes a relevant contact under International Shoe. In each case, his
position garnered four votes and ran headlong into a competing view of equal
strength.
B. The Split Decisions: Asahi and Burnham
Asahi featured a classic stream of commerce fact pattern concerning a
manufacturer of components. A Japanese company made tire valves and sold
them to a Taiwanese company. 97 The Taiwanese company incorporated the
valves into its tires, which it marketed throughout the world, including in
California. 1 The case is notable for its treatment of two issues. First is the split
over whether the component manufacturer had relevant contacts with
California.'" Second is the conclusion that jurisdiction in California would be
unconstitutionally unfair. 2°
Justice O'Connor, joined by three others, found insufficient contact. 20' She
capitalized on Brennan's language from Burger King, emphasizing that the
"constitutional touchstone" for personal jurisdiction is "whether the defendant
purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State.' 2°2  She
195. See 2 B. E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 377, at 1011 (5th ed. 2008) (stating that
if the plaintiff is a resident, the forum is presumed convenient and "the state has a strong interest in
giving its own residents an adequate forum for the redress of grievances" (citing Stangvik v. Shiley
Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 20 (Cal. 1991))).
196. Indeed, in Burger King, Brennan opined that when there is purposeful availment, "it may
well be unfair to allow [defendants] to escape [jurisdiction]." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985). Once contact is established through purposeful availment, Brennan said,
the forum state's interest would favor exercise of jurisdiction. Id at 477. Professor Rhodes asserts
that the burden on the defendant is high because once he has "obtained the requisite forum benefits
through purposeful conduct, then the defendant has a diminished liberty interest in avoiding the
state's jurisdictional power." Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and
Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REv. 567, 639 (2007) [hereinafter Rhodes, Liberty].
197. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 112, 116. Much of the dueling is over purposeful availment, which, of course, is
part of the contact analysis. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("I do not agree with the
interpretation in Part H-A of the stream-of-commerce theory, nor with the conclusion that Asahi did
not 'purposely avail itself of the California market."' (quoting id. at 112 (O'Connor, I.))).
200. Id. at 116 (majority opinion).
201. Id. at 112-13 (O'Connor, J.).
202. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
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characterized Burger King as having "reaffirmed the oft-quoted reasoning of
Hanson," requiring purposeful availment, invocation of benefits, and protections
of the forum's laws. 2° Thus, she concluded, "minimum contacts must come
about by an action of the defendant. '' 2°4 She likened the stream of commerce to
the unilateral activity of the consumer in World-Wide Volkswagen. As in that
case, mere foreseeability that the product will get to, or even be marketed in, the
forum is not enough. There must be additional conduct showing an "intent or
purpose to serve the market in the forum State.' '20 5 Because the record showed
no such additional conduct, O'Connor reasoned, there was no relevant contact.2°6
Brennan concluded that there was a relevant contact. 207 For him, awareness
that the component would be distributed in the forum sufficed: "As long as a
participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the
forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise."
208
Moreover, the defendant benefited economically from the sale of the finished
product in the forum. 2°9 It also benefited indirectly from the forum's laws that
"facilitate commercial activity."210  Brennan emphasized that this case, unlike
World-Wide Volkswagen, did not involve a consumer's taking the product to the
forum, but a "system of distribution that carried its valve assemblies into
California.
211
Brennan relied upon Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 212 a 1961 Illinois Supreme Court decision upholding jurisdiction in the
same basic fact pattern in the domestic context. The majority opinion in
World-Wide Volkswagen cited Gray for the dictum that jurisdiction is proper
"over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with
203. Id. at 109 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475).
204. Id. at 112 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
205. Id. at 110-12. Justice O'Connor suggested that this might be done by advertising or
providing customer service in the forum or by designing the product specially for use in the forum.
Id. Professor Stravitz points out that "[i]t would be highly unusual for a nonreplacement component
party manufacturer to engage in these types of consumer oriented activities." Stravitz, supra note
74, at 790.
206. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (O'Connor, J.).
207. Id. at 121 (Brennan, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 117.
209. Id. I have always wondered why more is not made in such cases of the fact that the
defendant makes money because of the market in the forum. That is, the valve manufacturer made
more money because the tire manufacturer sold the finished product into California. The same was
true in Asahi and in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (111.
1961). One could explain World-Wide Volkswagen in similar terms, by saying that the New York
distributor and retailer did not sell more cars (and therefore make more money) because of
Oklahoma. On the other hand, they might have sold more cars because Pennsylvania is there.
210. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 121.
212. Id. at 120 (citing Gray, 176 N.E.2d 761).
213. See Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 762, 767.
2012]
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the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.,
214
The unanimous opinion in Calder, cited Gray in rejecting the defendants'
argument that they should not be amenable to jurisdiction, because they, as
writer and editor of a defamatory story, could not be likened to a manufacturer
who put goods in the stream of commerce. 2 15 In view of this endorsement, the
fact that only four Justices signed on to the theory in Asahi is surprising.
Of course, eight Justices, including O'Connor and Brennan, ultimately
agreed in Asahi that California lacked jurisdiction based upon consideration of
the fairness factors. 216 This is the only case in which the Court has rejected
jurisdiction on that basis. But it was too easy. The sole remaining claim in the
case was between a Taiwanese company and a Japanese company. It concerned
indemnification under an agreement entered in Asia, and thus implicated no
217legitimate California interest. The dismissal could be based upon forum non
conveniens. 2t8 Because of the unusual facts and the international wrinkle, it is
not clear that Asahi gives much, if any, solace to a defendant trying to defeat
jurisdiction in the domestic context, especially in view of the presumption
established by Burger King2 and Brennan's dismissive views about ease of
travel and distant litigation.
Asahi is also noteworthy for what it did not discuss. None of the opinions
discussed Brennan's sliding-scale notion from Burger King. It would have fit
well in O'Connor's opinion. She could have said that the question of contact
was very close, so she would assess the fairness factors to see whether
jurisdiction could be upheld on a lesser showing of contact. She did not do so.
221
214. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (citing Gray, 176
N.E.2d 761).
215. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). In addition, Brennan cited Gray twice in his
dissent in Shaffer, both times for the proposition that jurisdiction is proper over an out-of-state
defendant who causes foreseeable harm in the forum. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223, 226
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105, 113-16 (majority opinion).
217. Id. at 114. The California courts upheld jurisdiction in part because of the state's interest
in road safety. Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 553 (Cal. 1985),
rev'd, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)). The Court rejected this notion, since the remaining dispute concerned
only indemnification, the plaintiff's claims had been settled, and any question about road safety
dissipated. Id. at 114-15. Professor Rhodes notes that the Court's refusal to defer to California's
stated interest demonstrates that it does not review personal jurisdiction cases under rational basis
scrutiny, but employs a more searching inquiry. See Rhodes, Liberty, supra note 196, at 612
("Thus, instead of deferring to the government, the Court undertook its own analysis of the strength
of the state's asserted interest in light of the individual interests at stake.").
218. See Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Constitutional Limitations, 59
U. COLO. L. REv. 9, 19 (1988) [hereinafter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction] (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981)).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 179-181.
220. See supra text accompanying note 190.
221. Similarly, Brennan could have used the method to make his point about contact while
ultimately rejecting jurisdiction. Perhaps he did not want to admit that the facts presented a close
[VOL. 63: 551
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This raises the question of whether her opinion is consistent with the two-step
World-Wide Volkswagen method. Having found no contact, it is not clear why
222she should have addressed fairness.
223The last personal jurisdiction case of Brennan's career was Burnham,
which also produced a 4-to-4 split, this time between a faction led by Brennan
and one led by Justice Scalia. The issue was more fundamental than that in
Asahi: did service of process in California support general jurisdiction in that
state, independent of International Shoe?224 Scalia concluded that it did, while
Brennan insisted on application of International Shoe.
225
Though he did not lay out the two-step test, Brennan's opinion was
consistent with it. He started with contacts, and here set the bar stunningly
low. 226  The defendant, by visiting California for a handful of days, availed
himself of benefits because his health and safety were protected, he was free to
use the roads, and he "likely enjoy[ed] the fruits of the State's economy."
227
Then Brennan discussed fairness, saying that "[tihe potential burdens on a
transient defendant are slight" because of convenient modern modes of travel
and state procedural provisions.228  So, "as a rule the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant based upon his voluntary presence in the forum will
satisfy the requirements of due process."
229
There are significant problems with Brennan's analysis in Burnham. First,
the benefits he notes are undoubtedly important to maintaining civil society. But
case, or a "lesser" contact. Similarly, perhaps O'Connor did not want to admit that contact
presented a close question.
222. Justice Scalia did not participate in that part of the opinion holding jurisdiction to be
unfair. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105. Presumably, this is because of his adherence to the rigid two-step
analysis: once he determined that there was no relevant contact between Asahi and California, there
could be no jurisdiction; assessment of fairness factors was irrelevant. See Donald L. Doernberg,
What's Wrong with This Picture?: Rule Interpleader, The Anti-Injunction Act, In Personam
Jurisdiction, and MC. Escher, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 551, 592 n.155 (1996) (citing Asahi, 480 U.S.
at 105).
The only Justice who seemed to have overtly rejected the approach was Stevens, joined by
White and Blackmun, who said: "An examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to
determine whether a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional." Asahi, 480
U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Stravitz, supra note 74, at 792 (noting that Stevens's
statement was "inconsistent with the jurisdictional framework adopted in Burger King").
223. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Grunes & Veen, supra note 6, at 539.
224. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607.
225. Id. at 628 (Scalia, J.); id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).
226. See id. at 637-38 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). The combination of a low requirement of contact and the extremely
high burden on the defendant to show that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair, reflected
Brennan's overarching pro-plaintiff position on personal jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying
notes 179-181.
227. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 637-38 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 476).
228. Id. at 638-39.
229. Id. at 639.
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they accrue automatically to everyone who sets foot in the state. 31 Indeed,
police and fire protection accrue to absentee landowners who never set foot in
the state. If the state's unilateral provision of such public services constitutes
purposeful availment, that requirement will have no independent significance.
23'
Such bootstrapping raises significant questions about the legitimacy of the power
asserted by the state. In the words of Dean Perdue, "[I]t is deeply disturbing to
suggest that as long as the government provides you with something of objective
value (that you might not want), it can legitimately extract something from you
(that you do not want to give up)." 232
Second, the case involved the exercise of general jurisdiction. Obviously,
it strains credulity to conclude that a few days' presence in the forum constitutes
the kind of continuous and systematic tie that can support jurisdiction for a claim
unrelated to forum activity. The assertion of general jurisdiction based upon
such limited contact would not have passed muster under Perkins or
Helicopteros. It certainly cannot stand under the new Goodyear decision, as we
will see below.
Brennan could have passed the straight-face test in arguing for personal
jurisdiction in Burnham by dusting off his "related to" notion from Helicopteros,S234
which he inserted into his opinion in Burger King. While the claim for child
support in Burnham may have arisen in New Jersey, where the couple had been
domiciled and raised their children, it was arguably related to California, since
the ex-wife had moved there and lack of support would have caused hardship in
23523that state. Brennan did not raise the issue, however.2 36
230. As Scalia pointed out, this is true even if the person is not served with process in the
state. Id. at 624 (Scalia, J.).
231. Hay, Burnham, supra note 189, at 597 (citing Burham, 495 U.S. at 623 (Scalia, J.)).
Scalia argued that exchanging three days' worth of public benefits in California for general
jurisdiction there "would not survive the 'unconscionability' provision of the Uniform Commercial
Code." Burnham, 495 U.S. at 623.
232. Perdue, supra note 193, at 541; see also Hay, Burnham, supra note 189, at 597 (citing
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 623) ("Justice Scalia is surely right in discounting Justice Brennan's
propositions as they are presented: expectation, based on a known (perhaps quite unilateral) practice
of the forum state, is not enough .... "). Provision of benefits does not necessarily result in
acceptance of benefits. Mr. Burnham's position in California (as a potential user of emergency
services) seems quite different from that of Mr. Hess in Hess v. Pawloski, who sought out and used
the public highways provided by Massachusetts. 274 U.S. 352, 353 (1927).
233. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607 ("The question presented is whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies California courts jurisdiction over a nonresident, who
was personally served with process while temporarily in that State, in a suit unrelated to his
activities in the State.").
234. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
235. Dean Hay has made this argument. Hay, Burnham, supra note 189, at 594 n.14
("Burnham could have been decided as a specific jurisdiction case, because Mr. Burnham's
presence in California and relationship there with his children at least 'relate' to claims for support
and custody.").
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At the end of the century, then, the two-step approach from World-Wide
Volkswagen seemed to be in place. Brennan had modified it in Burger King to
ameliorate its harshness. But no Justice had seen fit to address any of his
modifications. And while the Court rejected jurisdiction on fairness grounds in
Asahi, the facts were quite unusual. Brennan's presumption in Burger King,
along with his dismissiveness of the burdens of distant litigation, meant that a
domestic defendant's best bet is to argue that he lacked contact with the forum.
One of the most important contact issues, of course, is the stream of commerce.
And on that, the Court was equally split. Going into the new century, observers
assumed that the Court would break the Brennan-O'Connor tie.
Ill. THE NEW CENTURY: SEARCHING FOR A BRENNAN LEGACY
A. J. McIntyre
In J. McIntyre, the Court, 6-to-3, rejected New Jersey's invocation of a
stream of commerce rationale to exercise specific jurisdiction over a British
manufacturer of heavy machinery that injured the plaintiff in the forum. 237 The
facts differ from Asahi (and Gray) in that the defendant was not a maker of
components. McIntyre made the finished product, and sold them to a distributor
in Ohio, which then sold them to users in various states. 238 Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court speaks for a plurai0Y of four.239  Justice Breyer's
concurring opinion is joined by Justice Alito. And Justice Ginsburg's dissent
speaks for three Justices.2 4 1 Thus, while Asahi gave us a 4-to-4 split, McIntyre
manages a 4-to-2-to-3 configuration.
Others in this Symposium analyze the opinions expertly. My purpose is to
assess any Brennan influence. Clearly, Brennan would find nothing to like about
the Kennedy opinion. 242 First, the plurality expressly sides with O'Connor over
236. Perhaps the parties did not assert it. On the other hand, Brennan did not hesitate to raise
specific jurisdiction when the parties failed to do so in Helicopteros. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at
419-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785-86 (2011) (plurality opinion);
id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
238. See id. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
239. Id. at 2785.
240. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
242. In addition to the points discussed in text, Kennedy mischaracterizes Brennan. He
characterizes Brennan's Asahi opinion as "advocating a rule based on general notions of fairness
and foreseeability," as opposed to the defendant's actions, and further suggests that Brennan would
find jurisdiction without purposeful availment. Id. at 2789 (plurality opinion). In Asahi, however,
Brennan argued that the Japanese valve manufacturer had purposefully availed itself of the
California market. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan,
J., concurring). It did so directly by benefiting economically from the California market for tires
and indirectly from state laws facilitating economic activity. Id. at 117. One may argue about
whether those should constitute relevant contacts, but nowhere in Asahi did Brennan appear to
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Brennan in the Asahi split.243  Sending goods into the stream of commerce
"permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have
targeted the forum.' 24  Thus, "it is not enough that the defendant might have
predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.
' 245
Second, on a more fundamental level, Brennan would have rejected
Kennedy's statement that the improper assertion of jurisdiction by one state
"would upset the federal balance, which posits that each State has a sovereignty
that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States." 246 This statement
seems to signal a return to the assertion in World-Wide Volkswagen that personal
jurisdiction operates to guard interstate federalism. The Court rejected this
notion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, where it affirmed that personal jurisdiction
doctrine protects a liberty interest of the defendant. 248 This does not mean that
contacts are irrelevant. The liberty interest is more than a right to be free from
litigation in an onerous venue. As Professor Brilmayer has written, it is the right
to be free from the imposition of authority by a sovereign with which the
defendant lacks sufficient ties. 249 Limitations on personal jurisdiction reflect not
a matter of transgressing other states' authority, but of political legitimacy.
250
Kennedy addresses political legitimacy, saying that the lawfulness of a
judgment "depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it."'2 51 To
Kennedy, this authority-not "considerations of fairness and foreseeability"-is
assert that there could be jurisdiction without relevant contact. Id. at 116-21 (disagreeing with
conclusion that regular and extensive sales to a manufacturer known to be marketing finished
product in forum did not constitute "minimum contacts with California"). Similarly, in Burnham,
Brennan asserted that the defendant had availed, and therefore had a relevant contact with
California. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 637 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). Again,
reasonable people may disagree about whether the contacts should "count," but Brennan did require
them. Kennedy says that Brennan "discarded the central concept of sovereign authority in favor of
considerations of fairness and foreseeability." J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion).
As we have seen, however, foreseeability in this sense is part of the consideration of whether the
defendant has forged a relevant contact with the forum. See supra text accompanying notes 130-
131.
243. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion) ("[Tihe authority to subject a
defendant to judgment depends on purposeful availment, consistent with Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Asahi .....
244. Id. at 2788.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2789.
247. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
248. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
249. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1296
(1989) (referring to persons' "rights to be left alone").
250. Id. at 1295-97. Professor Brilmayer addressed choice of law doctrine, but recognized
personal jurisdiction as analogous. Id. at 1296. Others have also discussed political legitimacy in
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 193, at 534-46 ("Commentators
have begun to ... argu[e] that personal jurisdiction is a concrete manifestation of the problem of
political obligation and legitimacy."); Stein, supra note 123, at 690 ("[D]ue process limits on
personal jurisdiction ... allocate political authority between sovereigns.").
251. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion).
[VOL. 63: 551
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the "central concept" in personal jurisdiction doctrine. 252  And sovereign
authority depends, in turn, upon submission by the defendant. 53 Kennedy uses
254ofso
some form of the word "submit" eight times in his opinion. But, as Professor
Rhodes points out, the Court had never employed that term for personal
jurisdiction under International Shoe, and has limited it to cases of consent to
255
jurisdiction. The Court, including Brennan in Burger King, has long adopted
a social-contract notion that if one gets a benefit from availing himself of the
forum, he may have to "pay" by submitting to jurisdiction there. 256  But
Kennedy's focus on the need for the defendant to submit to the state's authority
seems to require a new degree of intentionality. 257 It reflects a narrow theory of
what creates legitimate government authority. Presumably, Brennan would say
that the state's legitimate interest in regulating affairs justifies jurisdiction over
nonresidents, so long as there is some contact, even short of "submission."
Though Kennedy never mentions it, his opinion is consistent with the rigid
two-step analysis of World-Wide Volkswagen. Because he found no contact,
Kennedy did not assess the fairness of jurisdiction. Indeed, he was willing to
concede that New Jersey's interest in protecting its citizens from defective
products is "doubtless strong.' 258 The issue was irrelevant because the defendant
had not "reveal[ed] an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of [New
Jersey's] laws. 259
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, also concluded that "these facts do
not provide [sufficient] contacts between the British firm and the State of New
Jersey.''26 To Breyer, the case did not satisfy the Brennan stream-of-commerce
test because there was no regular flow of sales into New Jersey.26' Rather, based
upon the record, there seemed to be only a single sale from the defendant to New
252. Id. at 2788-89. Similarly, "it is the defendant's actions, not his expectations, that
empower a State's courts to subject him to judgment." Id. at 2789.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 2785-91.
255. Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 74, at 415-17. As he notes, in Burger King, the
Court, in passing, noted that commercial parties may stipulate "to submit" their cases for resolution
in a particular forum with a forum selection clause. Id. at 417 n.171 (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985)). In Insurance Corp. ofIreland, it noted that a litigant
"may submit to the jurisdiction of the court by appearance." Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982). And, in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964), the parties spoke of agreeing "in advance to submit to the
jurisdiction of a given court."
256. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 781 (1984); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643,648 (1950)).
257. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788-89 (plurality opinion). Kennedy does not try to fit
intentional torts within his "submission" theory, saying that in such cases "the defendant might well
fall within the State's authority by reason of his attempt to obstruct its laws." Id. at 2787.
258. Id. at 2791.
259. Id.
260. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
261. Id. at 2792.
2012]
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Jersey, and "[n]one of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if
accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.
262
Breyer overlooked McGee. Black's opinion in that case upheld jurisdiction
over the Texas insurance company based upon one contract of insurance.
263
True, that contract involved some back-and-forth between the plaintiff and
defendant. But it was a single contract, which qualitatively provided sufficient
contact with California. 264 Moreover, the Court has upheld jurisdiction in tort
cases based upon a single contact at least three times: in Hess v. Pawloski,
Calder, and Keeton.265  Breyer's quantitative approach seems to give the
defendant at least one free shot; if the first few machines one sells in the forum
malfunction and injure people, there's no jurisdiction because there is no stream
yet-only an eddy. 26
Granted, the insurance company in McGee solicited the policy directly from
a Californian, 267 while J. McIntyre sold the New Jersey machine through a
268distributor in Ohio. Brennan would have pointed out, however, that J.
McIntyre set up that distribution system. 269 Moreover, because J. McIntyre sold
finished products, as opposed to components, it could exercise more effective
control over distribution. 270 And it sold more machines to the Ohio distributor,
and therefore made more money, because the Ohio distributor could sell into
271New Jersey.
Breyer's opinion also does not state a methodology, but might be consistent
with the rigid two-step model. Finding no contact, there was no need to discuss
fairness factors. On the other hand, Breyer found the record unclear concerning
contact, 272 which raises the question of who has the burden. Breyer seems
unaware of the burden-shifting regime from Burger King, which placed the
initial burden on the plaintiff to show contact, followed by a burden on the
262. Id.
263. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
264. Id.
265. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 353, 356-57 (1927); Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction,
supra note 218, at 26 n.95. Obviously, J. McIntyre involves a tort claim. 131 S. Ct. at 2786
(plurality opinion).
266. See id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
267. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
268. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
269. See id.
270. See id. at 2786. Brennan made this point in Asahi. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 121 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). Ginsburg made this point in her dissent
in J. McIntyre. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Asahi, 480
U.S. at 115); see also Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction, supra note 218, at 25 n.92 ("[U]se of a distribution
system, particularly an exclusive one, will more readily permit the conclusion that the requisite
expectation [of jurisdiction] was there.").
271. See discussion supra note 209.
272. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J. concurring).
[VOL. 63: 551
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defendant to show unfairness. 3 Breyer appears to put the entire burden on both
parts of the inquiry--contact and fairness-on the plaintiff.
274
Both Kennedy and Breyer seem unaware of the sliding-scale approach that
Brennan set forth in Burger King. If the disagreements among the Justices in
Asahi and J. McIntyre stand for anything, they must stand for the idea that these
are close cases on whether there is a contact. That being so, Burger King
counsels the court to assess the fairness factors to see whether jurisdiction might
be reasonable based upon lesser contact. The fairness assessment in J. McIntyre
would look like that in McGee.2"5 First, the plaintiff is injured and would find it
difficult to travel-especially to England-to sue. Second, New Jersey has an
interest in regulating the conduct of foreign manufacturers whose machines are
used there. Third, we know that Brennan would find no excessive burden on J.
McIntyre to litigate in New Jersey.276 A company that can send representatives
to trade shows, hire a distributor, and instruct that distributor to exploit the entire
continent can no doubt travel to one of the states to litigate. 277 Because the
fairness factors support jurisdiction, the Brennan sliding scale would uphold
jurisdiction based upon a single contact. But, as in Asahi, no one seems to have
thought of this possibility.
The most remarkable thing about the opinions by Kennedy and Breyer is the
lengths to which each Justice goes to conclude that there was no relevant contact.
Each supports his conclusion with hypotheticals worthy of the classroom.
Kennedy worries that a small Florida farmer, selling crops to a distributor for
national distribution, "could be sued in Alaska or any number of other States'
courts without ever leaving town.''278 Breyer fears jurisdiction in Hawaii over an
Appalachian potter who sells to a distributor "who resells a single item (a coffee
,,279mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii). In the international context,
Breyer worries that "a small Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing
cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee farmer, selling its products through international
distributors" might be sued "in virtually every State in the United States. 280
273. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S 462, 477 (1985).
274. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (plaintiff "failed to meet his
burden to demonstrate that it was constitutionally proper to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner").
275. See supra text accompanying note 60.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 190-191. On the other hand, J. McIntyre is an alien.
The burden imposed on aliens by litigation in the United States was at least relevant to eight
Justices in Asahi. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105, 114 (1987). The
facts here, of course, are much different. In Asahi, no American litigant remained in the case and
there was no legitimate state interest. Id. at 114. In J. McIntyre, the plaintiff is an American, and
New Jersey presumably has an interest in regulating safety for citizens such as Mr. Nicastro. See
131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
277. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
278. Id. at 2790.
279. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
280. Id. at 2794.
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The answer to these hypotheticals is not to strain to find that there is no
contact. 28' By finding no contact, the Justices rule out jurisdiction even in
convenient venues. When Kennedy concludes that the Florida farmer selling
through a distributor has no contact with Alaska, he must also conclude that the
farmer has no contact with Alabama. And Breyer's Appalachian potter who has
no contact with Hawaii also must have no contact with the state next door to his
Appalachian home.
Rather, the answer is to find that there is relevant contact, and to assess
whether jurisdiction would be fair. I suspect jurisdiction over the Florida farmer
in Alabama would be fair, while jurisdiction in Alaska might not.282 By focusing
on contact, however, we never engage in the exercise. Outside the unique facts
of Asahi, the Court has never used considerations of fairness to defeat
jurisdiction. Here, then, we see what I consider the irony of Brennan's fairness
analysis in Burger King and Burnham: by making it next to impossible to defeat
jurisdiction as overburdensome, Brennan forces judges to dig in their heels at
contact. Finding no contact is the only realistic way to defeat jurisdiction.
Kennedy and Breyer' s hypotheticals demonstrate the point.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in J. McIntyre is consistent with Brennan's view.
She concludes that the defendant availed itself of New Jersey-and apparently
283every other state. She criticized the plurality's emphasis on submission to
jurisdiction. 28 Part III of her opinion is striking for its application of what can
only be called the m6lange test.285 Reminiscent of Travelers Health and McGee,
she considers the burden on the plaintiff, burden on the defendant, state's
interest, and other factors, giving "prime place to reason and fairness."
286
Nonetheless, Ginsburg's dissent in one way may, surprisingly, reject
Brennan. In contrasting Asahi, Ginsburg notes that J. McIntyre sold finished
products, and not components. Accordingly, it can control where the machines
end up. The component maker, in contrast, has little control over where the
28 Tproduct ends up. Thus, says Ginsburg, the holding in Asahi does not apply to
the facts of J. McIntyre.288 This might be a concession that there was no contact
in Asahi, a conclusion with which Brennan obviously would disagree. Brennan
281. It might not be a strain to find no contact in some of the hypotheticals since it is unlikely
that the small Egyptian shirt maker would have an American distributor and attend trade shows in
the United States. See Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and
McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 233-35 (2011).
282. This is especially true with Breyer's international examples, such as the Egyptian shirt-
maker. There, considerations for the burden on the alien defendant, as addressed in Asahi, could
prove relevant.
283. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 2799 n.5 (citing id. at 2786-89 (plurality opinion)). She characterizes the
plurality's requirement of submission as a return to older practice. Id.
285. See id. at 2799-802.
286. Id. at 2800.
287. See id. at 2803 (quoting A. Uberti & C. v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354, 1361 (Ariz. 1995)).
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would have said that there was a relevant contact in Asahi, and that J. McIntyre
is therefore especially easy. Not only does the British company sell finished
products, but it sought out the American market and set up the distribution
channel.
J. McIntyre raised other topics on which Brennan opined through the years,
but which the Court did not have to address. For one, now that Mr. Nicastro
cannot sue the British company in New Jersey, may he sue it in Ohio? The
problem with specific jurisdiction is that the claim seems clearly to have arisen
in New Jersey. Here, as in Burnham, one might use the Brennan idea from
Helicopteros that specific jurisdiction be upheld if plaintiffs claims merely
relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum.28 9 The sale of the allegedly
defective machine into Ohio, from which the order to New Jersey was filled,
might satisfy the "relate to" standard. 290 But no Justice discussed the possibility.
If there were no specific jurisdiction, would Ohio have general jurisdiction
over J. McIntyre? Without question, under Goodyear, the answer is no.291 Even
if we can characterize the English company's ties with that state as continuous
and systematic, as we will see momentarily, Goodyear limits general jurisdiction. ... , • ,292
to states in which a corporation can be considered "essentially at home." It is
unlikely that J. McIntyre has any decision-making apparatus in Ohio on which to
base such a holding. Moreover, J. McIntyre's contacts with Ohio consist of sales
of its goods into that state. And Goodyear apparently precludes a finding of
general jurisdiction based upon sales into the forum.
293
Beyond this, even if Mr. Nicastro can sue in Ohio, what law would apply?
Why would it not be New Jersey law? After all, that is where the plaintiff
suffered injury at the facility in which the J. McIntyre machine was shipped. But
how can New Jersey law apply when that state lacks personal jurisdiction?
Brennan long advocated that choice of law and personal jurisdiction be analyzed
by a single standard.294 But the Court has never adopted such a standard. The
295two inquiries engage different interests. While personal jurisdiction requires
"minimum" contacts, the Court has spoken of "significant" contacts for choice of
296law. Nonetheless, in Hanson, the Court seemed to recognize that Florida law
would govern the dispute notwithstanding lack of jurisdiction over the Delaware
289. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 427 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
290. See, Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction, supra note 218, at 25-26 (contact in contract supporting
specific jurisdiction in tort).
291. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
292. Id. at 2851.
293. See infra text accompanying note 316.
294. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 464, 482 (1985).
295. See Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction, supra note 218, at 9; see also Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer
v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 82-83 (1978) ("The impact of a conflict of
laws decision more seriously affects the rights of the parties than a decision on jurisdiction .... ").
296. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981)).
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297trustee. One need not adopt the idea of a unitary standard to conclude that thisproposition "defie[s] common sense." 298
B. Goodyear
In Goodyear, the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld general
299jurisdiction upon a stream of commerce theory. It noted that the foreign
manufacturers' tires were sold in some appreciable and consistent measure in
North Carolina, that the defendants had made no effort to keep the products out
of North Carolina, that the state had an interest in providing a forum for its
citizens, and that suing in Europe would burden the plaintiffs unduly.3" The
Supreme Court rejected the use of stream of commerce to establish general
jurisdiction, and limited use of stream of commerce theory to cases of specific
jurisdiction.30 1 Even if Brennan would have agreed on that point, Goodyear
largely rejects Brennan's views on general jurisdiction.
First, in his dissent in Helicopteros, Brennan noted that Perkins had upheld
general jurisdiction when the defendant had "continuous and systematic" ties
with the forum.3° 2 But he suggested that nothing in that case required such a
finding.303  In other words, Brennan felt that general jurisdiction might be
appropriate based upon something less than continuous and systematic contact.
He did not elaborate, however, and the Court in Goodyear does not entertain the
suggestion; without doubt, "continuous and systematic" ties are required.
Second, Goodyear allows general jurisdiction only to a narrow subset of
defendants with continuous and systematic ties with the forum. General
jurisdiction is appropriate only where the defendant is "essentially at home in the
297. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). And in Kulko, "the Court noted that
California law may apply in a New York action for child support, but that the California courts did
not have jurisdiction to hear the case." Silberman, supra note 295, at 81 n.260 (citing Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978)).
298. Weintraub, supra note 132, at 536 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). Dean Hay suggests
that the problem in Hanson was "not the fault of conflicts law but of the quirk in Florida law which
made the nonresident trustee an indispensable party." Hay, Judicial Jurisdictiorl, supra note 218, at
27.
299. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A, v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)
(quoting Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394-95 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), rev'd sub nom. Goodyear,
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011)).
300. Id. at 2852-53 (quoting Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 392-94).
301. id. at 2854-57. It is not clear that any court or commentator had previously attempted to
base general jurisdiction on a stream of commerce theory.
302. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 421 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952)).
303. id. at 421 ("Under the circumstances of that case, we held that such contacts were
constitutionally sufficient 'to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the
jurisdiction' of that State. Nothing in Perkins suggests, however, that such 'continuous and
systematic' contacts are a necessary minimum before a State may constitutionally assert general
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation." (quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445)).
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forum State. ' '304 For a human, the Court says, the "paradigm forum" for general
jurisdiction is the person's domicile. 30 5 "[F]or a corporation, it is an equivalent
place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.
3 6
Parenthetically, Ginsburg notes that a corporation's state of incorporation and its
principal place of business would be paradigmatic. 307 Though paradigmatic does
not mean exclusive, 308 it is not at all clear how far "essentially at home" reaches.
And though the Court has recently defined principal place of business for
purposes of diversity of citizenship to be the "nerve center, '"3° 9 can a "muscle
center" make a business essentially at home? What about a regional
headquarters? What about a corporation that has outlets in every state, such as
McDonald's, or Wal-Mart, or Ford Motor? The uncertainty opens the door for
significant restriction from the current practice of exercising general jurisdiction
over corporations "doing business" in a state.310
Third, any parsimoniousness of the essentially at home notion is
compounded by the Court's embrace of the 1923 case Rosenberg Brothers & Co.
v. Curtis Brown Co.311 In his dissent in Helicopteros, Brennan harshly criticized
the majority for relying on Rosenberg without considering whether that case
survived International Shoe.3 12 In Rosenberg, the Court held that an Oklahoma
corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in New York.313 Its ties there
consisted of purchases of "a large part of the merchandise" it sold in
Oklahoma.3 14 The Court concluded that purchases of goods and visits by
304. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 2857 (noting that the defendants "are in no sense at home
in North Carolina").
305. Id. at 2853.
306. Id. at 2853-54.
307. Id. at 2854 (quoting Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66
TEx. L. REv. 721,728 (1988)).
308. See Brilmayer, supra note 307, at 735-43 (discussing general jurisdiction over
corporations based upon activities); see also Brilmayer, Contacts, supra note 190, at 87
("Systematic unrelated activity, such as domicile, incorporation, or doing business, suggests that the
person or corporate entity is enough of an 'insider' that he may safely be relegated to the State's
political processes.").
309. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010).
310. Any narrowing of the concept of general jurisdiction over businesses will affect venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(C), which defines an entity's residence for venue purposes as districts in
which the entity is subject to personal jurisdiction when the case is commenced. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c) (2006).
311. 260 U.S. 516 (1923). The Court in Goodyear does not cite Rosenberg by name, but its
quote from Helicopteros is from a description of that case. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417-18 (1984)).
312. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 420-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court relies on a 1923
decision in Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), without considering
whether that case retains any validity after our more recent pronouncements concerning the
permissible reach of a State's jurisdiction .... The Court therefore looks for guidance to our 1923
decision in Rosenberg, which until today was of dubious validity given the subsequent expansion of
personal jurisdiction that began with International Shoe in 1945." (internal citations omitted)).
313. Rosenberg, 260 U.S. at 518.
314. Id.
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officers, "even if occurring at regular intervals, would not warrant the inference
that the corporation was present" in New York.31 5
Goodyear actually extends Rosenberg to cases involving sales into the
316forum state. Thus, businesses like L.L. Bean, which sell potentially enormous
quantities of goods into various states, cannot be subject to general jurisdiction
there on the basis of such sales. The extension of Rosenberg to sales into a
forum seems wrong-headed. It is one thing to say that general jurisdiction
should not be based upon purchases in the forum. After all, purchases simply
send money into the forum states. Money cannot explode or malfunction or hurt
anyone. But sales into a state are quite another matter, because the products sold
may explode or malfunction and hurt people. Nonetheless, Goodyear appears to
have ruled out general jurisdiction based upon sales. Brennan, having
championed general jurisdiction in Helicopteros and chided the Court about
citing Rosenberg in the same case, would surely dissent.
C. A Scorecard
All three opinions in J. McIntyre and the unanimous opinion in Goodyear
discuss or cite Brennan positions. Perhaps this is not surprising given Brennan's
well-known efforts to delineate personal jurisdiction doctrine. But the scorecard
shows that Brennan has had little actual influence on doctrine.
* First, despite opportunities in Burnham and J. McIntyre, the Court
has never engaged his idea that specific jurisdiction may involve
claims that "relate to"-rather than "arise from"-contacts with the
forum.
* Second, despite opportunities in Asahi and J. McIntyre, the Court
has never engaged Brennan's sliding-scale approach from Burger
King.
* Third, the Court has never adopted his suggestion for a unitary
personal jurisdiction/choice-of-law standard.
* Fourth, Brennan's stream of commerce theory from Asahi may have
gone from having four adherents on the Court to having three.
* Fifth, Brennan's views on general jurisdiction appear soundly
rejected.
315. Id.
316. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856-57.
317. Certainly, the four Justices in the plurality reject it. Breyer and Alito did not reject it, but
read it quite narrowly. See supra text accompanying notes 260-266.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Brennan's personal jurisdiction journey was long. Steeped in Black's early
efforts to read International Shoe broadly, Brennan continued the battle for
Black's m6lange approach to personal jurisdiction. Converting to the two-step
approach, he finally wrote a majority opinion in Burger King. There, where he
attempted to curb the rigidity of World-Wide Volkswagen to ensure that the
courts weigh general considerations of fairness in every case. The opinions in J.
McIntyre suggest that Brennan's effort in that regard bore no fruit. The Justices
remain riveted on the issue of contact between the defendant and the forum.
Ironically, this obsession may be Brennan's fault. It is Brennan's opinion in
Burger King-with its nearly impossible burden on the defendant to defeat
jurisdiction by appealing to considerations of reasonableness and Brennan's
dismissiveness about concerns with distant litigation-that puts the premium on
contact. Finding a lack of contact is the only realistic way most defendants will
have to defeat jurisdiction. Thus, we see six Justices straining with bizarre
hypotheticals to reject a finding of contact. It seems that Justice Black's fear that
International Shoe would be used to stifle state's exercise of personal
jurisdiction318 is being realized. And at the end of the day, Black's disciple
Brennan-the leading proponent of an open-ended fairness analysis-may have
forced the Court exactly where he did not want it to go: to an entrenched and
cramped view of what constitutes a relevant contact under International Shoe.
318. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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